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1 Introduction
Fund managers compete for investor’s money by signaling their ability to generate risk-
adjusted returns (or alpha) to the market. Using Microsoft’s TrueSkill to estimate each
manager’s skill, we study the impact on the portfolio’s risk level. We find highly skilled
managers to take systematically more risk within one year’s tournament compared to less
skilled managers. These results are robust regarding different market phases, different
years with pronounced risk-shifting incentives, and different empirical approaches.
Our work contributes to the existing literature by introducing Microsoft’s TrueSkill
algorithm as a new measure and thus regarding the tournament nature of the fund man-
agers as a ”game”. Building upon Bayesian network theory, TrueSkill identifies and tracks
the skills of managers in a competitive setting in which the belief about a manager’s skill
is estimated on the basis of a manager’s past performance relative to all other active
managers. Despite broad evidence for the long-term underperformance of active man-
agers against a benchmark (Fama, 1965), individual managers seem to outperform the
market in the short-term, resulting in higher fund inflows and compensation (Sirri and
Tufano, 1998; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008b), hence promoting a competitive environment
among fund managers.
Second, we extend the empirical work in the area of fund tournaments, which was first
introduced by Brown et al. (1996). They analyze the behavior of mutual fund managers
within one year and detect a risk-seeking investment style for mid-term losers. Replicating
their findings, our results indicate winners increasing their risk suggesting a different trend
of individual behavior in tournaments in recent years. We then follow Kempf et al. (2009)
and highlight risk-shifting differences in years driven by incentives (winners are rewarded
for their outperformance) and years driven by unemployment risk (losers are facing high
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chances of having their funds closed due to underperformance). We extend this area of
research by detecting certain investment patterns based on the individual skill level of
the managers and highlight the correlation between skill and risk-seeking.
The remainder is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the fund tourna-
ments’ setup and Microsoft’s TrueSkill, Section 3 contains the empirical analysis, while
the final section concludes.
2 Fund Tournaments & Skill
2.1 The Economics of Tournaments
Research in the fields of managerial tournaments is considered as a subset of the agency
theoretic contracting theory, which deals with the disparity between principals’ and
agents’ interests and risk aversions. Bolton et al. (2005) summarize the basic assumptions
and implications for multiple scenarios in different areas of economics.
The underlying premise of our analysis is to view the market for portfolio management
service as a multi-period decision making. This implies that investors decide in a cyclical
pattern which fund service to invest in. One significant aspect of this investment process
is the established compensation structure within the fund industry. Fund managers are
often compensated based on their funds’ assets under management which implies large
incentives to generate high fund inflows. Empirical evidence for the positive correlation
in a multi-period context of the past performance of the individual fund and new fund
inflows has been provided for example by Sirri and Tufano (1998).
This correlation leads to the plain risk adjustment hypothesis in literature of losing
managers increasing their risk at mid-term in order to catch up on the leading managers
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where σpL indicates the risk level of a loser’s portfolio in period p ∈ {1, 2} of a two-
period annual tournament and σpW the risk level of a winner’s portfolio, respectively.
Multiple researchers followed this hypothesis and analyzed various aspects and impli-
cations such as different time periods, competition within fund families, the impact of
the selected fund segment, among others. Important ideas and results can be found in
the works of Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Busse (2001), Deli (2002), Kempf and Ruenzi
(2008a), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b), and Bär et al. (2010). Despite the findings of all
these researchers, there are still contrary opinions about the existence of such tournament
behavior between managers and especially the exact behavioral aspects for winners and
losers, respectively.
2.2 The Impact of Prior Performance through TrueSkill
New fund inflows are positively correlated with the standings of the individual fund at
the end of the tournament, i.e. the end of the year. Most investors tend to trust in
the past performance of a fund and expect it to result in positive returns at or around
the benchmark level once the fund claims a top-level within a certain year. Hence,
investors update their beliefs about the strength of an individual manager based on past,
observed returns, and prior beliefs. In empirical research, this behavior has been modeled
for example by Berk and Green (2004), who use a model that includes two key aspects:
First, the performance of fund managers is not persistent and, second, investors behave as
Bayesians. The first aspect can be interpreted as fund managers are not outperforming a
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passive benchmark continuously. Second, investors update their belief about the strength
of an individual manager based on past, observed returns, and prior beliefs. This leads
to the concept of conditional probabilities also known as Bayesian probability where
the probability is interpreted as some reasonable expectation based on prior beliefs and
knowledge.
The TrueSkill algorithm has been developed by a team from Microsoft Research in
2005 and is used for match-making in various online games ever since. The purpose of
this ranking system is to detect and track the skill of individual players despite playing
in teams, derive public rankings, and implement a match-making system that allows
players of the same skill to play against each other. The general idea behind TrueSkill is
to update the presumption about a player’s skill based on the observed outcome of a given
game. This technique is called Bayesian inference as explained for example by Box and
Tiao (2011). TrueSkill characterizes the belief of a manager’s skill as Gaussian uniquely
described by its mean µ and standard deviation σ (cf. Microsoft Research (2005)). The
parameter µ can be interpreted as the average manager’s skill belief whilst σ describes
the uncertainty about that skill level. The more games a participant plays, the smaller
becomes his σ and therefore, the knowledge about a player’s skill becomes more precise.
Furthermore, his average skill level µ is updated based on the match outcome.
One of the most important advantages of TrueSkill is its adaptivity to any underlying
setup of ranking match outcomes. It only needs a clear ranking for each match - whether
teams are compared with each other or individuals. We will give a brief overview of the
underlying process of TrueSkill in order to derive a basic understanding of its functionality.
However, we will not explain every mathematical step and its technical realization within
the algorithm but refer to the paper of Herbrich et al. (2006).
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Let k managers with a total of n funds {1, ..., n} compete in a match. Each fund is
uniquely assigned to a single manager resulting in k disjunct subsets Aj ⊂ {1, ..., n}. For
each match, the outcome r := (r1, ..., rk) ∈ {1, ..., k} indicates the match specific ranks
rj for each manager j in an ascending order; i.e. rj = 1 is the winner and possible draws
are given as ri = rj. Making use of Bayes’ rule, the conditional probability P (r|s, A) of
the game outcome r given the individual skills s := (s1, ..., sn) of all participating funds
in their manager assignments A := (A1, ..., Ak) leads to the posterior distribution of
p(s|r, A) = P (r|s, A)p(s)
P (r|A)
. (2.2)
The prior distribution of the funds’ skill f(s) :=
∏n
i=1N (µi, σ2i ) is assumed to be a
factorizing Gaussian whilst each fund i has a performance fi ∼ N (si, β2i ) in the match,
centered around their individual skill si with fixed variance β
2
i . With TrueSkill, the per-
formance mj of a manager j is defined as the sum of its individual funds’ performances
indicated by mj :=
∑
i∈Aj fi (cf. Herbrich et al. (2006)). Figure 1 shows the exemplary
process of TrueSkill as a factor graph. This methodology is used in information tech-
nologies to describe complicated ’global’ functions consisting of many variables which
are most likely derived themselves from various ’local’ functions. Those global functions
factor as a product of the local functions and can therefore be described in a bipartite
graph called factor graph. Further information can be found in Kschischang et al. (2001).
2.3 Identifying Skill Based Tendencies in Risk-Shifting
In a first step, we calculate the six-month rolling information ratio as a performance
measure of each fund. We use these ratios to create a rating of the funds on a monthly
base to feed-forward to the TrueSkill algorithm. At this stage, funds with less than
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Figure 1: Schematic Work of TrueSkill as a Factor Graph
Notes: Schematic work of TrueSkill illustrated as a factor graph (based on Herbrich et al.
(2006)) for the resulting joint distribution p(s, f, ,|r, A) of three managers with a total
of four funds and manager 1 winning whilst manager 2 and manager 3 draw (k = 3,
A1 = {1}, A2 = {2, 3}, A3 = {4} and the ranking r := (1, 2, 2)). The black boxes
represent the factor functions which are used to calculate the local variables - visualized
by the light grey circles. The grey arrows indicate the initial calculation of the skill
level for all three managers followed by the ’inner iteration circle’. This circle is used
to approximate the new skill level of all managers whilst after that, the black arrows
indicate the updates of the skill beliefs for each individual fund.
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one year of tracking record prior to the start of the tournament year are also included
due to the initial calculation of skill levels. Second, the funds included in the annual
tournaments compete against each other on a monthly base whereas their skill level -
and therefore the skill level of each manager - is calculated by TrueSkill based on the
performance rankings. To compare the skill level of different fund managers, we use only
each manager’s expected average skill level µ once the skill development is calculated. To
overcome biases for new managers who have not reached their intentional skill level yet,
we only consider managers and therefore funds with at least one year of tracking record.
This leads to at least 18 matches between all managers and their funds before they are
categorized at the end of a tournament’s interim period for the first time.
To analyze the skill dependent risk-shifting, we use conditional transition matrices for
the best 20% (high skill), the next 60% (medium skill), and the least 20% (low skill) of
each year’s managers. We follow the work of Ammann and Verhofen (2009) and adapt
this transition approach, commonly known from credit default analyses. The transitions
are based on the historical volatility of each manager’s portfolio, whereas each manager
is assigned to a risk tercile:
(ei1, ei2) ∈ {1, . . . , 3}2, i = 1, . . . , 3 (2.3)
with ei1 characterizing the risk tercile of manager i in the interim period and ei2 the risk
tercile in the second half of the year’s tournament. Here, 1 indicates the highest risk
tercile and 3 the lowest, respectively. These migration events of the same kind are now





1{(ei1, ei2) = (j, k)} (2.4)
is the number of migration events from j to k and 1{. . . } the indicator function.
Furthermore, we assume that the observations ei2 are the realization of the random
variables ẽi2 with conditional probability distribution
pjk = P (ẽi2 = k | ẽi1 = j) ,
3∑
k=1
pjk = 1 (2.5)
with the probability pjk of the risk level of a manager’s portfolio to change from the







k=1 cjk. To identify any differences between the differently skilled man-
agers, we use a chi-squared test to check for pairwise homogeneity of the transition













is asymptotically χ2-distributed with two degrees of freedom. The variable p̂+jk models
the estimated probability based on the aggregated data of the two transition matrices
and s is the index for the respective sample, e.g. high- and medium-skilled manager.
By the nature of this approach our analyses put emphasis on the whole dynamics of
the risk-shifting tendencies of differently skilled fund managers. Transition matrices as
employed in this study are, inter alia, widely used in the literature on credit risks (cf.
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Höse et al. (2009) for details) and in previous studies focusing on prior performance and
risk-taking of mutual fund managers (Ammann and Verhofen, 2007, 2009).
3 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis builds on the two databases Morningstar and Bloomberg. Follow-
ing Brown et al. (1996) and further researchers in their choice of taking growth-oriented
US equity funds due to the high interest of financial press and direct investor involve-
ment, we include all funds classified by the Morningstar categories US OE Large Growth,
US OE Small Growth and US OE Mid-Cap Growth. We use monthly closing prices by
Bloomberg of the categorized funds for the period of 1991 to 2017. This long period allows
analyzing the behavior of the managers in various market situations since the selected
period combines multiple different aspects such as financial crisis and market phases with
a positive long-term trend, e.g. 2009-2017. All funds are listed in US dollar and we clean
them for survivorship bias.
Furthermore, we tackle the fact that various funds are team-managed and multiple
managers handle more than one fund by using a string matching algorithm to identify
funds managed by the same managers. We exclude all team-managed funds and match
the remaining funds clearly to a single manager. This results in 559 individual managers
who hold at least one fund on their own within the given time period.
We include all funds in each year’s tournament which have at least one year of tracking
record and do not miss any data point in the given period. Also, we use two periods of
six months to analyze the risk-shifting, which leads to June being the end of the interim
period. Those managers above the average at that point are classified as winners and
those below as losers. Managers with two or more funds fulfilling these requirements are
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Figure 2: Managers per Tournament and Benchmark Related Performance.
Notes: Black (white) bars indicate a positive (negative) average active return in the
respective year.
considered to hold an equally weighted portfolio of their funds to reduce the impact of pro-
active risk-shifting across multiple funds. To calculate benchmark related performance
measures, we use the data of the MSCI North America for the same period. An overview
of the annual tournaments and the average performance of its participating manager
against the benchmark is given in Figure 2.
There are several options to measure risk-levels of mutual funds. Examples are the
return standard deviation, the tracking-error standard deviation which is the standard
deviation of the excess returns of the fund over a benchmark, or the systematic risk a
fund takes which is commonly estimated via a market model. However, the latter two are
rather uncommon in mutual fund tournament studies. We follow previous studies and
measure risk by the annualized standard deviation of the monthly fund returns (Brown
et al., 1996; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008b).
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3.1 Measuring Performance with TrueSkill
We start our empirical analysis by demonstrating TrueSkill’s capability to take prior
performance into account. Figure 3 shows the development of the Pearson correlation
coefficients between the TrueSkill based rankings of all participating funds within the
tournament of five, two, and one years and their information ratio rankings. The left
panel shows the correlation with TrueSkill levels being calculated for 4 years prior to
2015, the middle one with 1 year prior, and the right one with TrueSkill establishment
just starting in 2015. Hence, Figure 3 underlines the time dependence of TrueSkill and its
adaptation of prior performance while establishing skill levels. Since investors’ decisions
are often based on behavioral aspects such as prior performance or performance of fund
family members (e.g. Sirri and Tufano (1998), Nanda et al. (2004)), TrueSkill is an
adequate skill measure due to its capability of incorporating these aspects.
3.2 Skill Driven Risk-Shifting
Table 1 shows the aggregated risk-shifting tendencies for the whole sample period. It is
structured into four panels - the first one is showing the unconditional transition rates
based on the risk terciles in the first and second half of the year and the other three panels
are showing the transition rates for the different skill levels. Thus, the three skill-based
transition matrices are sub-samples of the unconditional case. The χ2-values are repre-
senting the H0-hypotheses of conditional transitions being equal to the unconditional.
Panel D shows significant differences to the unconditional case at the 5% and 1% level
for winners and losers, respectively. Indeed, the tendencies in increasing the risk levels
are much lower for managers with less skill than for those with high skill.
The first observable pattern is the difference in general risk-seeking between winners
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Figure 3: Correlation of TrueSkill and Information Ratio
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the Pearson rank correlations between TrueSkill
and its underlying performance measure over different time spans for an exemplary year
(2015). More precisely, the left (middle, right) figure shows the rank correlation between
the TrueSkill rankings estimated over the trailing five (two, one) years and the rankings
based solely on the information ratio over the trailing six months to the corresponding
month in 2015.
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Table 1: Risk Transitions Aggregated 1992-2017
Values in % Winner Loser
Risk tercile high medium low χ2 high medium low χ2
Panel A: Unconditional
high 62.4 25.7 11.8 61.3 25.0 13.7
medium 30.0 44.8 25.2 26.6 40.9 32.5
low 11.1 32.9 56.0 11.2 28.1 60.7
Panel B: High Skill
high 62.5 27.0 10.5 64.8 23.6 11.5
medium 29.0 47.1 24.0 25.8 43.0 31.1
low 12.8 31.1 56.2 0.93 12.3 30.4 57.3 2.94
Panel C: Medium Skill
high 63.0 24.6 12.3 61.0 24.8 14.3
medium 31.7 42.6 25.6 27.1 42.7 30.2
low 11.3 35.0 53.7 2.74 12.2 29.1 58.7 2.08
Panel D: Low Skill
high 60.2 28.0 11.8 59.0 27.1 13.8
medium 25.4 49.2 25.4 25.8 34.3 40.0
low 8.1 29.1 62.8 7.43** 7.9 24.4 67.8 13.1***
Notes: This table shows the risk-shifting tendencies from the year’s first-half tercile to the
tercile in the second half of the year for the full aggregated dataset. Panel A represents
the whole sample, whilst Panel B to D show the transitions for different skill levels.
Each manager is classified as being a winner (loser) if his performance measured by the
information ratio lies above (below) the median at the end of the interim period. χ2-
values testing H0-hypotheses of conditional transitions being equal to the unconditional.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed tests),
respectively.
and losers in general. Whilst winners tend to stay at their initial level or even increase the
risk in the second period of the year, losers act the other way around. With transition
rates of 30.0, 11.1, and 32.9 for winner compared to rates of 26.6, 11.2, and 28.1 for
losers, Panel A demonstrates the risk-seeking behavior of winners. Vice versa rates of
risk decreasing by 25.7, 11.8, and 25.2 compared to 25.0, 13.7, and 32.5 complement
this pattern. The subsamples given by Panel B to D indicate similar patterns across
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the different skill levels. Still, a lot of managers stay within their first half risk tercile
with transitions up to 62.4. The transitions for remaining managers are highest for the
extreme risk terciles of high and low risk.
Looking at the impact of different skill levels for either tournament standing, we find
clear tendencies of high-skilled managers increasing their risk more often than those with
less skill regardless of their first-half performance. The comparison of Panel B and Panel
D shows higher risk increasing rates for skilled managers in both positions. Hence, the
risk decreasing rates are always higher for managers with less skill. Additionally, the risk
remaining transitions are bigger for high-skilled managers in the highest risk tercile and
low-skilled managers in the lowest risk tercile, respectively.
The subsample for high- and medium-skilled managers are also closely related to the
unconditional one. The χ2-test values show no significant differences here. In contrast,
the subsample of low-skilled managers differs from the unconditional sample at the 5%
level for winners and even at the 1% level for losers. This indicates more controversial
behavior for the minority of less-skilled managers, who seem to secure their wins if possible
and cut their losses during bad tournaments.
In the next step, we take a closer look at years of extreme risk-shifting. Therefore,
we aggregate the five years with the highest risk decreasing by losers and those with
the highest risk increasing by losers whilst winners acting vice versa. These periods are
classified as years dominated by unemployment risk and years dominated by compensa-
tion incentives. Hence, we follow Kempf et al. (2009) in their explanation for different
risk-shifting tendencies in special periods. The five compensation incentive dominated
years are 1992, 1995, 2006, 2014, and 2017, identified in Table 4 in Appendix A as those
years where the highest RARs are given for mid-year losers. The years dominated by the
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risk of unemployment are 1993, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2016; these are the years where
losers have extremely low risk adjustment ratios at mid-term.
Table 2: Risk Transitions Based on Extreme Risk-Shifting
Values in % Winner Loser
Risk tercile high medium low high medium low
Panel A: Compensation Incentive Dominated
High Skill
high 57.5 35.0 7.5 72.0 28.0 0.0
medium 12.5 52.5 35.0 47.8 34.8 17.4
low 10.0 30.0 60.0 8.7 34.8 56.5
Low Skill
high 43.3 40.0 16.7 47.1 41.2 11.8
medium 26.9 42.3 30.8 25.0 39.3 35.7
low 12.5 16.7 70.8 8.9 17.9 73.2
χ2 5.17* 12.3***
Panel B: Unemployment Risk Dominated
High Skill
high 75.9 24.1 0.0 71.2 15.4 13.5
medium 31.0 57.1 11.9 4.0 64.0 32.0
low 0.0 26.4 73.6 0.0 22.2 77.8
Low Skill
high 77.8 18.5 3.7 67.5 25.0 7.5
medium 25.8 61.3 12.9 18.9 32.4 48.6
low 4.1 26.5 69.4 2.3 22.7 75.0
χ2 0.79 9.68***
Notes: This table presents risk transitions for aggregated data of the five years dominated
by compensation incentives and unemployment risk, respectively. The selection of the
years is based on risk adjustment ratios for each year. χ2-values representing homogeneity
test statistic for transitions of high- and low-skilled managers. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed tests), respectively.
Table 2 highlights the differences between years dominated by compensation incentives
(Panel A) and years dominated by unemployment risk (Panel B). Overall, both panels
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show similar patterns of winners increasing the risk level in the second half as well.
Whilst Panel B has no significant difference between skilled and unskilled winners, Panel
A emphasizes the overconfidence of managers with higher skill levels, who are seeking
more risk past the interim period. The difference between skilled and unskilled managers
is significant at the 10% level.
More importantly, the skill level of individual managers affects their decision making
in a losing scenario. Skilled managers seem to rely on their prior performance and increase
their risk level dramatically with transitions of 47.8, 8.7, and 34.8 in years dominated
by compensation incentives. Instead of cutting their losses, they attempt to catch up
by investing very self-confident. Less skilled managers behave differently and cut their
losses. They have decreasing transitions of 41.2, 11.8, and 35.7. Here, the skill level
of each manager seems to determine his behavior dramatically. The difference between
these types of skills is significant at the 1% level. In years dominated by unemployment,
the majority of all managers decrease their risk level in the second half of the year, if
they lose. Only very few skilled managers try to increase their risk level at this stage
and instead, a few managers with less skill start to gamble for a win. Those few seem to
go all in before their funds are closed permanently. The difference between skilled and
unskilled managers is again significant at the 1% level.
Ammann and Verhofen (2007) introduce another dynamic Bayesian network approach
to analyze the impact of prior performance. They find similar results given as risk-
increasing behavior after years of good performance and decreasing risk-taking after bad
years. Within their following work, Ammann and Verhofen (2009) even highlight the same
patterns of winning managers increasing their risk in the following period and loser acting
vice versa. Our findings are in line with their results and even underlining the impact of
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prior performance - measured as investor’s belief about the individual manager’s skill.
3.3 Robustness Tests
Underlying performance measure The most important parameter within the TrueSkill
setup seems to be the choice of the underlying performance measure to calculate monthly
rankings, which are the start of further skill calculations. We test for the impact of dif-
ferent performance measures by repeating our analysis with monthly active returns of all
participating managers. Table 5 in Appendix B shows very similar results to our previous
analysis indicating high-skilled managers to increase their risk most of the time regard-
less of their performance in the first half of the year. These results underline the high
correlation between different performance measures as shown by Eling and Schuhmacher
(2007). We calculate the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients inclusive a two-
sided p-value for a hypothesis test with the null hypothesis of non-correlation between
the data series for three different measures. Table 6 in Appendix B outlines the strong
and significant correlation between the Sharpe ratio, Information ratio and active return
rankings. We conclude that the choice of the underlying performance measure does not
affect our initial results significantly.
Skill thresholds The results could be driven by the choice of quantiles that classify
managers into their skill level. In the main specification, we classified the top 20% as
highly skilled and the bottom 20% as low-skilled which leaves a 20-60-20 split. Other
reasonable splits, e.g. 10-80-10, lead to the same conclusions as we show in untabulated
results.
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Risk adjustment ratio approach Our next robustness test deals with the general
tournament behavior regardless of the individual skill of each manager. Therefore, we
replicate the contingency table approach introduced by Brown et al. (1996) based on the
risk adjustment ratios. The results presented in Table 4 in Appendix A are in line with
our results of skill-driven investments, indicating a different trend of individual behavior
in tournaments in recent years. Winners have higher RARs in most of the years, which
is in contrast to earlier findings of Brown et al. (1996). Still, this demonstrates that our
findings are in line with previous methodologies.
Hyperparameter of the prior distribution In our empirical analysis, we set the
initial prior distribution of the fund managers’ skills as described in Section 2.2 as f(s) :=∏n
i=1N (µi, σ2i ) with µi = 25 and σi =
µi
3
≈ 8.33. Please note that the average skill level
µi is not of much interest in absolute terms since all managers are assumed to start with
the same initial skill. Since we do not define a unit to measure the skill other than
using the Gaussian’s parameters µi and σi, the relative belief of two fund managers given
by their skill distribution is of higher relevance. In that terms, it does not make much
difference whether we start with a level of 10, 100, or the standard level of 251 as proposed
by Herbrich et al. (2006), which originates from TrueSkill’s early comparability with the
ELO ranking.
To underline the low impact of the initial priors on our results, we vary the relation
between µi and σi, i.e. σi ∈ {µi2 ,
µi
4




, see Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix B.
The neglectable impact of the priors is in line with the theoretical expectation about
their impact: With sample size n −→ ∞ the difference between two posteriors based on
1We confirm this assumption in unreported results.
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different Gaussian priors tends towards zero. The same holds for larger prior variances
σi, as outlined for example by Ley et al. (2017).
Different benchmark indexes Within our analysis, we use a risk-adjusted approach
to determine the rankings of each manager used for the TrueSkill algorithm. In fact,
our measure of choice is the information ratio as a market model adjustment measure
where the benchmark is the MSCI North America. Given the different setup of mutual
funds and their long-term purposes, e.g. equity-only, long-only, multi-asset, and so on,
our chosen benchmark might not be appropriate for every mutual fund in the universe.
Nevertheless, we restrict our fund sample to growth-oriented US equity mutual funds as
earlier researchers before (Brown et al., 1996; Taylor, 2003; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008b).
The categorization is based on the widely accepted classification by Morningstar, which
leads to a quite homogeneous sample. We qualify this putative sample restriction by
similar arguments used in earlier research.
However, Morningstar specifies two benchmark indexes for each of its categories. The
primary index for all three categories used in this study is the S&P500 which correlates
almost perfectly with the MSCI North America. The secondary benchmark index differs
for each category.2 We repeat our analysis benchmarking each fund on its secondary
benchmark index and report the results in Table 9. Overall, the conditional transition
matrices differ stronger from the unconditional transition matrix than in our baseline
case. In line with our previous findings, we find a tendency that winning managers
increase their risk more than losers and that managers classified as low-skilled seem to
adjust their risk less than managers classified as high-skilled.
2Secondary benchmark indexes are Russell 1000 Growth, Russel Mid-Cap Growth, and Russel 2000
Growth for the Large Growth, Mid-Cap Growth, respectively Small Growth category.
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Regression approach On the basis of the conditional transition matrix approach, our
results suggest that the risk-shifting tendencies are significantly different for low- and
high-skilled fund managers and, beyond that, that high-skilled managers tend to increase
their risk-levels to a higher extent compared to low-skilled managers. We acknowledge
that conclusions like these have to be interpreted with caution due to unobservable co-
variates that might influence the results. To mitigate the effect of omitted variables
and provide further empirical evidence for our conclusions, we formulate the following
regression model:
∆σi,t = β1Ranki,t ×DHi,t + β2Ranki,t ×DLi,t + β3σFirst Halfi,t + εi,t (3.1)
where the dependent variable, ∆σi,t = σ
Second Half
i,t −σFirst Halfi,t , is the change in standard
deviations of fund i’s returns from the first to the second half of the year t. Ranki,t
denotes the rank of the fund manager with respect to all other managers scaled to the
interval [0, 1] (1 being best). High respectively low manager skill is denoted by D∗i,t
with ∗ ∈ {H,L}. In a further specification, we replace Ranki,t with dummy variables
indicating that a fund manager ranked in the top 20% respectively bottom 20% of all
active managers analogous to the main analysis. For all specifications, we include time
and fund-company fixed effects. The latter control, for example, for all time-invariant
characteristics attributable to a manager’s company that may influence the results.
We present the results of four specifications in Table 3, two each using either the
information ratio or active returns to estimate the managers’ skill levels via TrueSkill.
All specifications indicate that high-skilled fund managers significantly increase their risk
after performing well in the first half of the year. Contrary, we find the opposite signs
for any coefficient associated with risk-shifting of less-skilled fund managers. Equality
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tests reject the null hypotheses DWin ×DH = DWin ×DL and DLoss ×DH = DLoss ×DL.
The explained variation in risk-shifting amounts to ≈ 75%, which is a common value in
fund tournament studies. Overall, the results support our conclusions drawn from the
conditional transition matrix approach and provide further insights on the channels that
foster the results.
Table 3: Regression Models of Different Skill-Levels on Risk-Shifting
Information Ratio Active Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank × DH 0.005* 0.006*
(1.889) (1.940)
Rank × DL −0.003 −0.003
(−0.584) (−0.689)
DWin× DH 0.003* 0.005**
(1.747) (2.060)
DWin× DL −0.003 −0.003
(−1.042) (−0.986)
DLoss× DH 0.003 0.003
(0.909) (0.917)
DLoss× DL −0.004 −0.008***
(−1.580) (−2.854)
σFirst Half −0.361*** −0.363*** −0.362*** −0.365***
(−5.116) (−5.124) (−5.114) (−5.143)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5155 5155 5157 5157
Adjusted R2 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.748
Notes: This table presents results of a regression of fund managers’ performance in the first half of
the year on their risk-shifting in the second half, conditional on their estimated skill levels (high, low).
Rank denotes the rank of the fund manager scaled to the interval [0, 1] (1 being best) and D indicate
dummy variables for high or low skill, or for ranking among the top 20% best or worst managers. Robust
standard errors are clustered by year. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
(two-tailed tests), respectively.
Comparison to ELO Last, we compare TrueSkill with another popular skill measure
- the ELO rating, most known from the world of chess. The ELO ranking system is used
in competitive chess as well as various unofficial rankings, e.g. online gaming or football
tournaments. It is much simpler in its calculations and therefore not capable to adapt
teams playing each other. Figure 4 shows the skill development of three random managers
22
of the whole period sample measured by TrueSkill and ELO. Both ratings are based
on monthly matches between all managers participating in a given year’s tournament.
The skill levels are normalized to make them comparable since the absolute level differs
between both systems. Due to our premise of being included in a year’s tournament if
and only if there is more than one year of tracking record, the managers seem to start
with different levels, but in fact, they started all with the same setup, initially. The
ELO ratings vary rapidly on a high frequency, whilst the TrueSkill ratings are adjusting
themselves much slower and only react to unexpected outcomes.
Figure 4: Different Skill Development of Three Random Fund Managers
Notes: This figure shows the temporal development of skill ratings based on TrueSkill and
ELO for three randomly chosen fund managers from our sample. ELO is a method for
calculating the relative skill levels, commonly used in chess. The bottom figure compares
the rolling standard deviations of the two methods highlighting the stable skill belief
estimated via TrueSkill.
The third panel of Figure 4 underlines the differences in volatility by representing the
rolling standard deviation over 12 months of the normalized ELO and TrueSkill ratings,
respectively. Hence, the average TrueSkill standard deviation is at 0.106 and therefore
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much lower than the one of ELO given as 1.907. A good skill measure should offer low
volatility to establish a stable belief about the skill level of an individual manager in the
long-term. The time stability of TrueSkill shows its potential to classify managers into
skill levels and derive skill-based behavior from it.
Summarizing the results of the robustness checks, our results about the impact of skill
are in line with theories in behavioral finance and psychology, showing the overconfidence
of outperforming managers in their investment decisions. Taylor and Brown (1988) find
evidence of people having unrealistically positive views of themselves which leads to
the described self-confidence not only after being among the winners for a couple of
competitions and De Bondt and Thaler (1995) detect a positive correlation between high
confidence and above average-trading frequencies.
4 Conclusion
Our results highlight the self-confident behavior of skilled managers by holding or in-
creasing their portfolio risk in almost every situation compared to those with less skill.
Applying the TrueSkill algorithm to display investors’ beliefs about the individual skill
level of fund managers, we present a way to model the positive correlation of prior per-
formance and new investment decisions.
The impact of good performance in recent years seems to lead to an over-confident
investment style of managers, who are shifting their portfolio risk towards the higher
tercile of the peer group in the second half of the year. Only a few managers classified
with less skill increase their risk in a losing situation. We demonstrate the robustness of
our results regarding the choice of the performance measure to rank the managers each
month as well as the usability of TrueSkill as an adequate representation of investor’s
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belief about a manager’s skill.
25
References
Ammann, M. and M. Verhofen (2007). Prior performance and risk-taking of mutual fund
managers: a dynamic bayesian network approach. Journal of Behavioral Finance 8 (1),
20–34.
Ammann, M. and M. Verhofen (2009). The impact of prior performance on the risk-taking
of mutual fund managers. Annals of Finance 5 (1), 69–90.
Bär, M., A. Kempf, and S. Ruenzi (2010). Is a team different from the sum of its parts?
Evidence from mutual fund managers. Review of Finance 15 (2), 359–396.
Berk, J. B. and R. C. Green (2004). Mutual fund flows and performance in rational
markets. Journal of Political Economy 112 (6), 1269–1295.
Bolton, P., M. Dewatripont, et al. (2005). Contract theory.
Box, G. E. and G. C. Tiao (2011). Bayesian inference in statistical analysis, Volume 40.
John Wiley & Sons.
Brown, K. C., W. Harlow, L. T. Starks, et al. (1996). Of Tournaments and Tempta-
tions: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry. Journal of
Finance 51 (1), 85–110.
Busse, J. A. (2001). Another look at mutual fund tournaments. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 36 (1), 53–73.
Chevalier, J. and G. Ellison (1997). Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to incen-
tives. Journal of Political Economy 105 (6), 1167–1200.
26
De Bondt, W. F. and R. H. Thaler (1995). Financial decision-making in markets and
firms: A behavioral perspective. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management
Science 9, 385–410.
Deli, D. N. (2002). Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation. Journal
of Finance, 109–133.
Eling, M. and F. Schuhmacher (2007). Does the choice of performance measure influence
the evaluation of hedge funds? Journal of Banking & Finance 31 (9), 2632–2647.
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. Journal of Business 38 (1),
34–105.
Herbrich, R., T. Minka, and T. Graepel (2006). TrueSkillTM: a Bayesian skill rating
system. In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Neural Information
Processing Systems, pp. 569–576. MIT Press.
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A General Tournament Behavior
To detect general tournament behavior, we follow Brown et al. (1996) by using their con-
tingency table approach to determine the risk adjustments during the second half of the
tournament: The performance of every manager i is given as the information ratio IRiM
against the MSCI North America in the first 6 months of the year to identify mid-term
winners and losers as those above or below the median information ratio, respectively.
All managers hold an equally weighted portfolio of their funds j ∈ {1, ..., n} included in
the tournament with a portfolio return of rportik .
In order to calculate the information ratio for each fund given as IR = active premia
tracking error
,






− 1, which finally leads










The variable RTNb is the cumulative return of benchmark returns rbk of month k ∈
{1, ..., 6}. The risk adjustment ratio (RAR) of manager i for the given tournament year














with r̄i(12−6) and r̄i representing the mean portfolio return of fund manager i before
and after the assessment date, respectively. This variable measures the risk adjustments
of a given portfolio within the two periods of the year’s tournament by comparing the
portfolio’s volatility in both periods. Thus, we rank the RAR in a similar way as the IR
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Table 4: Contingency Tables of Annual Tournaments










1992 94 19.2 30.9 30.9 19.2 5.1489 0.1612
1993 97 33.0 17.5 17.5 32.0 9.6907 0.0337
1994 109 22.9 27.5 27.5 22.0 1.1284 0.7702
1995 135 20.2 30.6 29.9 19.4 5.8806 0.1176
1996 153 25.8 25.2 24.5 24.5 0.0728 0.9949
1997 165 27.9 22.4 22.4 27.3 1.7636 0.6229
1998 189 26.1 24.5 23.9 25.5 0.2128 0.9755
1999 220 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0000 1.0000
2000 245 33.1 17.1 17.1 32.7 24.208 0.0000
2001 269 34.2 16.0 16.0 33.8 34.985 0.0000
2002 325 25.9 24.3 24.3 25.5 0.2552 0.4625
2003 350 27.1 22.9 22.9 27.1 2.5714 0.4625
2004 362 30.4 19.6 19.6 30.4 16.807 0.0008
2005 340 23.0 26.8 27.1 23.0 2.1563 0.5406
2006 328 20.2 30.0 30.0 19.9 12.927 0.0048
2007 311 30.4 20.1 19.7 29.8 12.877 0.0049
2008 296 27.8 22.0 22.4 27.8 3.6983 0.2959
2009 259 24.9 25.7 25.3 24.1 0.1362 0.9872
2010 231 26.0 24.2 24.2 25.5 0.2208 0.9742
2011 215 27.0 23.3 23.3 26.5 1.0558 0.7878
2012 208 27.4 22.6 22.6 27.4 1.9231 0.5885
2013 196 24.5 25.5 25.5 24.5 0.0816 0.9930
2014 193 21.2 29.0 29.0 20.7 4.9896 0.1726
2015 185 31.3 18.9 18.9 30.8 10.957 0.0120
2016 169 33.1 17.2 17.2 32.5 16.633 0.0008
2017 148 21.0 29.1 29.1 21.0 3.8919 0.2734
a Number of managers within the given tournament year.
b Based on the null hypothesis of every cell receiving 25% of the distribution.
Notes: This table presents the annual contingency tables of risk adjustment ratios (RAR)
for the whole dataset covering the years 1992-2017. Managers who perform at the end of
the interim period above (below) the median are classified as winners (losers). The same
methodology applies to the classification of high (low) RARs.
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and determine high RAR as those above the median and low RAR as those below the
median for the first and second period, respectively.
B Tables – Robustness Tests
Table 5: Risk Transitions Aggregated 1992-2017 - Active Return
Values in % Winner Loser
Risk tercile high medium low χ2 high medium low χ2
Panel A: Unconditional
high 62.6 25.9 11.5 61.1 24.9 14.0
medium 31.0 44.7 24.2 25.5 40.9 33.7
low 12.1 32.2 54.8 10.2 27.9 61.9
Panel B: High Skill
high 64.1 26.4 9.5 66.5 24.1 9.4
medium 35.5 45.0 19.5 26.9 43.8 29.4
low 16.2 34.7 49.1 5.96* 14.2 29.1 56.7 7.18**
Panel C: Medium Skill
high 61.7 25.2 13.1 59.3 25.3 15.4
medium 29.4 44.4 26.2 26.1 41.6 32.3
low 11.1 32.2 56.7 1.92 10.3 29.4 60.3 2.06
Panel D: Low Skill
high 63.5 27.6 8.8 61.0 24.5 14.5
medium 31.0 45.7 23.4 22.2 36.1 41.7
low 9.7 34.8 55.5 0.64 7.3 22.8 69.9 13.63***
Notes: This table shows the risk-shifting tendencies from the year’s first-half tercile to the
tercile in the second half of the year for the full aggregated data set. Panel A represents
the whole sample, whilst Panel B to D show the transitions for different skill levels. Each
manager is classified as being a winner (loser) if his performance measured by the active
return lies above (below) the median at the end of the interim period. χ2-values testing
H0-hypotheses of conditional transitions being equal to the unconditional. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed tests), respectively.
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Table 6: Rank Correlations Based on Different Performance Measures
Performance measures Sharpe ratio Active return Information ratio
Sharpe ratio 1
Active return 0.983*** 1
Information ratio 0.943*** 0.963*** 1
Notes: The ranks are calculated over a time period from 1992 to 2017. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed tests), respectively.
Table 7: Results for Different Hyperparameters: σ = 12.5
Values in % Winner Loser
Risk tercile high medium low χ2 high medium low χ2
Panel A: Unconditional
High 62.4 25.7 11.8 61.3 25.0 13.7
Med 30.0 44.8 25.2 26.6 40.9 32.5
Low 11.1 32.9 56.0 11.1 28.2 60.7
Panel B: High Skill
High 62.6 26.7 10.8 65.8 23.8 10.4
Med 29.2 46.6 24.2 26.8 42.5 30.7
Low 13.0 31.3 55.7 6.35** 13.5 31.8 54.7 0.66
Panel C: Medium Skill
High 62.7 25.0 12.3 61.0 25.4 13.6
Med 32.1 42.7 25.2 27.2 42.9 29.9
Low 11.5 34.7 53.7 2.75 12.2 29.4 58.3 2.63
Panel D: Low Skill
High 61.1 27.4 11.5 57.6 25.3 17.2
Med 23.9 49.4 26.7 24.8 34.8 40.5
Low 7.3 29.6 63.1 22.25*** 6.8 22.5 70.8 8.58**
Notes: This table shows the risk-shifting tendencies from the year’s first-half tercile to
the tercile in the second half of the year for the full aggregated data set for a different
choice of hyperparameter for the prior distribution of the fund managers’ skills, e.g. σ =
12.5. Panel A represents the whole sample, whilst Panel B to D show the transitions for
different skill levels. Each manager is classified as being a winner (loser) if his performance
measured by the active return lies above (below) the median at the end of the interim
period. χ2-values testing H0-hypotheses of conditional transitions being equal to the
unconditional. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-
tailed tests), respectively.
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Table 8: Results for Different Hyperparameters: σ = 6.25
Values in % Winner Loser
Risk tercile high medium low χ2 high medium low χ2
Panel A: Unconditional
High 62.4 25.7 11.8 61.3 25.0 13.7
Med 30.0 44.8 25.2 26.6 40.9 32.5
Low 11.1 32.9 56.0 11.1 28.2 60.7
Panel B: High Skill
High 64.7 23.9 11.4 64.1 22.2 13.8
Med 26.9 46.2 26.9 23.7 41.0 35.3
Low 11.2 36.2 52.6 4.36 11.8 32.4 55.9 3.42
Panel C: Medium Skill
High 61.8 26.3 11.9 60.8 25.9 13.3
Med 33.1 43.1 23.8 27.0 43.6 29.4
Low 12.0 32.6 55.3 3.50 11.9 29.6 58.5 1.98
Panel D: Low Skill
High 61.8 26.1 12.1 60.5 24.9 14.6
Med 23.9 48.3 27.8 27.7 33.0 39.4
Low 8.0 29.3 62.6 16.75*** 9.0 22.3 68.8 7.26**
Notes: This table shows the risk-shifting tendencies from the year’s first-half tercile to
the tercile in the second half of the year for the full aggregated data set for a different
choice of hyperparameter for the prior distribution of the fund managers’ skills, e.g. σ =
6.25. Panel A represents the whole sample, whilst Panel B to D show the transitions for
different skill levels. Each manager is classified as being a winner (loser) if his performance
measured by the active return lies above (below) the median at the end of the interim
period. χ2-values testing H0-hypotheses of conditional transitions being equal to the
unconditional. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-
tailed tests), respectively.
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Table 9: Risk Transitions Aggregated 1992-2017 - Secondary Benchmarks
Values in % Winner Loser
Risk tercile high medium low χ2 high medium low χ2
Panel A: Unconditional
High 62.4 25.7 11.8 61.3 25.0 13.7
Med 30.0 44.8 25.2 26.6 40.9 32.5
Low 11.1 32.9 56.0 11.1 28.2 60.7
Panel B: High Skill
High 68.7 23.6 7.7 67.5 23.4 9.1
Med 31.6 43.1 25.4 24.2 38.8 37.1
Low 16.5 34.6 48.9 8.65** 12.8 31.5 55.7 10.52***
Panel C: Medium Skill
High 60.3 25.7 14.0 57.8 27.1 15.1
Med 29.2 44.7 26.1 28.2 43.1 28.7
Low 10.8 33.0 56.1 5.78* 10.4 29.2 60.4 1.35
Panel D: Low Skill
High 60.9 28.7 10.3 65.0 20.7 14.3
Med 30.7 46.5 22.8 24.0 36.3 39.8
Low 6.5 30.8 62.7 9.90*** 12.3 22.6 65.1 5.61*
Notes: This table shows the risk-shifting tendencies from the year’s first-half tercile to the
tercile in the second half of the year for the full aggregated data set for a different choice
of benchmarks for the funds in the sample. While in the baseline specification all funds
are benchmarked against the MSCI North America, they are now benchmarked against
different Russel indexes, see Section 3. Panel A represents the whole sample, whilst Panel
B to D show the transitions for different skill levels. Each manager is classified as being
a winner (loser) if his performance measured by the active return lies above (below) the
median at the end of the interim period. χ2-values testing H0-hypotheses of conditional
transitions being equal to the unconditional. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed tests), respectively.
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